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OPINION
____________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant James Meyer
(“Plaintiff” or “Meyer”), a Union Railroad employee for
approximately 31 years, purchased a credit disability
insurance policy from Appellant CUNA Mutual Group
(“CUNA”) in connection with the financing by the URE
Federal Credit Union (the “credit union”) of an automobile
Meyer purchased. The policy would make the car loan
payment on Meyer‟s behalf in the event he was deemed
disabled. Following an injury on the job, Meyer received,
pursuant to the policy, disability benefits in the form of credit
union payments on the loan for his vehicle. After covering
Meyer‟s payments for approximately three years, CUNA
notified him that it would not continue to pay his disability
benefits. CUNA found that Meyer no longer met the
definition of Total Disability, as defined under CUNA‟s
policy.
Meyer filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania on his own behalf and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, each
claiming disability insurance benefits that had been initially
2

granted and later denied under credit disability insurance
policies that had been purchased from CUNA. The principal
claim asserted a breach of contract, pursuant to the credit
disability insurance policy.
Both parties filed cross-motions seeking the grant of
summary judgment. The crux of the dueling motions
involved the definition of Total Disability. The District Court
granted Meyer‟s motion for partial summary judgment and
granted in part CUNA‟s motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the District Court found the definition of the
term “Total Disability” ambiguous and therefore construed it
in favor of Meyer, the insured.
Before the Court entered its Final Judgment, it asked
the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issues of
estoppel, waiver, prejudgment interest, and a claims process
related to resolution of the claims. Based on the Court‟s
summary judgment finding that the more inclusive
interpretation of total disability prevailed, Meyer argued that
CUNA had either waived its right to request medical
information from class members to show their respective
disability status during the requisite time period because
CUNA told them they no longer qualified or should be
estopped from doing so in the claims process. He also argued
that class members should be awarded prejudgment interest
on their claims.
The Court entered a Permanent Injunction and Final
Judgment setting up a claims review process for former class
members. It rejected Meyer‟s claims for waiver, estoppel,
and prejudgment interest and then decertified the class,
pursuant to CUNA‟s motion for decertification.
CUNA appeals that part of the District Court‟s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Meyer on the interpretation of
the definition of “Total Disability” as well as its Permanent
Injunction and Final Judgment. On cross-appeal, Meyer
argues that the District Court erred in not applying the theory
of estoppel or waiver to the class members‟ claims for
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damages and in not awarding prejudgment interest to the class
members‟ benefits.1
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the
District Court‟s grant of summary judgment with respect to
its interpretation of “Total Disability,” vacate its Permanent
Injunction and Final Judgment, and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
i. Factual Background

Appellee James Meyer was a brakeman and conductor
for Union Railroad for approximately 31 years. On February
24, 1999, Meyer purchased credit disability insurance,
pursuant to a group policy issued by CUNA to the credit
union, in connection with his automobile loan. The policy
provided that if Meyer became totally disabled, CUNA would
make payments to the credit union covering Meyer‟s
outstanding debt on his car loan. The policy‟s definition of
“Total Disability” provided:
during the first 12 consecutive months of
disability means that a member is not able to
perform substantially all of the duties of his
occupation on the date his disability
commenced because of a medically determined
sickness or accidental bodily injury. After the
first 12 consecutive months of disability, the
definition changes and requires the member to
be unable to perform any of the duties of his
occupation or any occupation for which he is
reasonably qualified by education, training or
experience.
(App. at 39.) As required by Pennsylvania law, the policy
was approved by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department.

1

Meyer does not appeal the remainder of the District Court‟s
grant of summary judgment in favor of CUNA.
4

Diane Konz (“Konz”), a CUNA employee, worked
with a team of employees at CUNA to draft and submit
insurance contracts to state regulators. The drafting team
included the manager of claims, the manager of underwriting,
the manager of accounting, and an actuary. Konz testified,
during her deposition, that she drafted the policy language at
issue during CUNA‟s efforts to modify policies to include
plain language.
On May 27, 2000, Meyer suffered a work place injury
and filed a claim for disability benefits under his CUNA
policy. In response to the claim, CUNA awarded Meyer
benefits for the period of July 7, 2000 to July 7, 2001,
pursuant to the definition of “Total Disability,” that governed
the first 12 months of disability. CUNA found that Meyer
was totally disabled according to the policy for that time
period. CUNA continued to pay Meyer benefits from July 8,
2001 through November 24, 2002, as it found that Meyer was
covered according to the definition regarding the post-12
month period.
Meyer visited his doctor, Dr. Antoin Munirji, on a
monthly basis during this period, who provided CUNA with
medical information about Meyer. Pursuant to the policy‟s
eligibility requirements, Meyer‟s physicians, including
Munirji, regularly provided CUNA with updates regarding
Meyer‟s disability status. On several occasions, Meyer‟s
physicians certified to CUNA that he was capable of
returning to work in a sedentary, light, or medium duty
capacity, which Meyer does not dispute.
On January 27, 2003, CUNA notified Plaintiff that it
was terminating his benefits based on information received
from his physicians that Meyer could return to work in some
capacity. CUNA determined that Meyer was therefore no
longer totally disabled as defined in the post-12 month period.
CUNA sent Meyer a form letter which stated that “the
information obtained indicated [he was] capable of modified
light duty work.” (App. at 41.) That, “along with other
information contained in [his] file,” indicated that he was “no
longer unable to perform any occupation.” (Id.)
5

Although Meyer was authorized by several physicians
to return to work in some capacity subject to light or medium
duty restrictions, he was never cleared by any physician to
return
to
his
time-of-injury
occupation
as
a
conductor/brakeman at Union Railroad.
ii. Procedural Background
Subsequent to CUNA‟s termination of his benefits,
Meyer brought an action in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself
and similarly situated individuals who were granted, and later
denied, benefits (that is, disability payments on loan debt)
under credit disability insurance policies they obtained from
CUNA, pursuant to its definition of “Total Disability.”
In his amended complaint, Meyer sought certification
of a nationwide class based on claims for breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair
Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-1, et seq. (“UTPCPL”), violation of
Pennsylvania‟s bad faith insurance statute, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8371 (“Section 8371”), and breach of
Pennsylvania‟s common law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Before the District Court, Meyer argued that the policy
definition of “Total Disability” was unambiguous and should
be interpreted to mean that after the first 12 consecutive
months, the insured qualifies as totally disabled if he can
show either (1) that he is unable to perform the duties of his
occupation; or (2) that he is unable to perform the duties of
any occupation for which he is reasonably qualified by
education, training, or experience. CUNA submitted that the
language in the policy created a shift from an “own
occupation” definition of disability to an “any occupation”
definition after 12 months and that the clause was
unambiguous. It argued that for coverage, a claimant must
not be able to perform his duties and any of the duties of a job
for which he was qualified.
On December 16, 2004, the Court held a class
certification hearing. CUNA also filed a motion to dismiss
6

Meyer‟s amended complaint which, on December 20, 2004,
the District Court granted as to the breach of fiduciary duty
claim, granted, in part, as to the unfair trade practices claim,
and denied, without prejudice, as to the breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. On January 25,
2006, the Court granted plaintiff‟s motion for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
for the following class of plaintiffs:2
All persons who purchased disability insurance
issued in Pennsylvania from the defendant
CUNA Mutual Group, or its subsidiaries, which
policies contain the definition of total disability
including the following material language:
„After the first twelve consecutive months of
disability, the definition changes and requires
the Member to be unable to perform any of the
duties of his occupation, or any occupation for
which he is reasonably qualified‟, [sic] to the
extent that such individuals were determined by
the defendant to be not able to perform all of the
duties of his or her occupation, but were
determined by the defendant to be capable of
sufficient physical activity that the defendant
decided that they were no longer eligible for
total
benefits
under
the
defendant's
interpretation of the subject policy.
(App. at 38.)
On February 5 and 6, 2007, the parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. Meyer moved for partial
summary judgment on the District Court‟s interpretation of
the “Total Disability” definition of the insurance contract.

2

For class notice purposes, CUNA determined that 4,734
persons had received the benefit denial letter in question and
potentially fell within the class definition; however, at the
April 14, 2009 status conference before the District Court,
Meyer‟s counsel stated that just under 3,000 claims members
remained.
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CUNA moved for summary judgment regarding all of
Meyer‟s claims.
On September 28, 2007, the District Court issued its
summary judgment opinion granting Meyer‟s motion for
partial summary judgment and resolving the policy definition
of “Total Disability,” finding that it was ambiguous because
both Meyer‟s and CUNA‟s proffered interpretations were
reasonable;3 it therefore construed the definition in Meyer‟s
favor. In so finding, the District Court stated that any
claimant who met the “own occupation” standard of the
second clause (and could not perform the duties of his preinjury occupation duties after 12 months) would “be totally
disabled within the meaning of the policy.” (App. at 55.)
The District Court also granted in part, and denied in
part, CUNA‟s motion for summary judgment. It granted the
motion regarding Meyer‟s unfair trade practices claim, breach
of good faith and fair dealing claim, and violation of bad faith
insurance statute claim. For Meyer‟s bad faith insurance
claim, the Court reiterated that it found CUNA‟s
interpretation of the “Total Disability” definition was
reasonable, even more so, than Meyer‟s, and that Meyer
produced no evidence of a dishonest purpose or ill will on
CUNA‟s part that would constitute bad faith under the
relevant Pennsylvania statute.
The District Court also denied CUNA‟s motion with
respect to count two—breach of contract—finding that
because it had granted Meyer‟s motion for summary
judgment on contract interpretation, CUNA was “liable for
breaching the contract for terminating the benefits of any
class member who could not return to his time of injury job.”
(App. at 55.) The District Court noted, however, that there
was “sufficient evidence of record to create a material
3

In fact, based on its analysis on summary judgment, the
District Court agreed with CUNA that its interpretation of
“Total Disability” was more reasonable than Meyer‟s,
however, it recognized that where an ambiguity exists in an
insurance contract in Pennsylvania. It must be construed in
favor of the insured. (App. at 54.)
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question of fact . . . as to the remaining issues under the
breach of contract claim, namely (1) which of the potential
members is actually a member of the class, and (2) what are
the damages for each class member.” (Id.)
Following its summary judgment ruling, the District
Court noted that the only remaining issue to be resolved was
CUNA‟s potential liability for breach of contract. CUNA
then filed a motion to decertify the class based on its
argument that the damages issue would require detailed,
individual inquiries that were not appropriate for class action
treatment.
The District Court allowed briefing from both parties
on the subject of a claims process. The District Court held
hearings on the matter on July 27, 2009 and September 14,
2009, where it considered numerous aspects of efficiency,
including fairness to the class members.
On September 21, 2009, following the hearings, the
District Court entered a Permanent Injunction and Final
Judgment. The District Court found that in light of its
interpretation of the policy provision on summary judgment,
“there remain[ed] triable issues of fact regarding only
Defendant‟s potential liability for breach of contract.” (Id. at
3-4.)
The District Court “reserve[d] jurisdiction and
discretion to take such further action as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement, enforce, or modify the provisions
of th[e] Order for a period of two (2) years after the date of
entry of th[e] Order.” (Id. at 3, ¶ 1.)
The District Court also laid out an extensive claims
process. It required CUNA to process completed claim forms
in accordance with a timeline and guidelines laid out by the
District Court using the District Court‟s interpretation of
“Total Disability.” If CUNA chose to dispute a claim,
claimants could notify CUNA and appeal to the District Court
Judge. The District Court noted that it “[t]hereby retain[ed]
jurisdiction of all matters relating to the interpretation,
administration, implementation, effectuation and enforcement
of this Injunction and this Final Judgment, including, without
limitation, the provisions of Part II of this Final Judgment and
Order.” (Id. at 6.)
9

Anticipating its immediate ruling on the decertification
of the class that day, the Court acknowledged that the
remaining issues in the case did not satisfy the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for
class certification, and that it “[would] be entering an Order
granting CUNA Mutual‟s Motion to Decertify the Class.”
(Id. at 4.) That same day, in a separate order, the District
Court decertified the class subsequent to its Permanent
Injunction and Final Judgment.4 See Id. at 660. In its Final
Judgment, the District Court found that “the remaining issues
to be adjudicated d[id] not satisfy the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for class
certification,” and so it would be entering an order granting
CUNA‟s motion to decertify the class. (Id. at 4.)5
On October 16, 2009, CUNA appealed the District
Court‟s judgment. On November 3, 2009, the District Court
granted CUNA‟s motion to stay the Permanent Injunction and
Final Judgment pending the outcome of the instant appeal.
CUNA appeals the District Court‟s summary judgment ruling
with respect to its interpretation of “Total Disability,” and the
District Court‟s Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment.
Meyer filed a Cross-Appeal seeking review of the District
Court‟s decision not to apply the doctrines of estoppel or
waiver to the class members‟ claims and to deny claimants
prejudgment interest with respect to their claims.
4

CUNA asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in
its initial class certification of Meyer‟s claims based on the
same argument against the permanent injunction—that the
individualized analyses into the circumstances of each class
members‟ disability claims destroys the typicality,
predominance, and superiority requirements of Rules 23(a)
and 23(b)(2). To the extent that CUNA attempts to contest
the District Court‟s initial certification, that issue has already
been decided by the District Court, and is not before us on
appeal.
5

As Meyer did not seek review of the class decertification,
the appeal comes before us decertified, which means that all
putative class members now have to assert their claims
individually.
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II.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter based on
diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We
have jurisdiction over this matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review a district court‟s grant of summary
judgment de novo. See Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott
Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment
is appropriate “if, drawing all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, „the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‟” Id. at 581 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
We review a district court‟s grant of a permanent injunction
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474,
478 (3d Cir. 2005). Our review of a district court‟s award of
equitable relief, like estoppel or waiver, is also for abuse of
discretion. James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.
2008). The court‟s decision to award prejudgment interest in
an action based on diversity of citizenship is a question of
state law. See Jarvis v. Johnson, 668 F.2d 749, 741 (3d Cir.
1982).
We review a district court‟s interpretation of
Pennsylvania law de novo.
See Staff Builders Of
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Koschitzki, 989 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir.
1993).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Interpretation
of
“Total
Disability”
Definition in Summary Judgment Ruling

The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law
applies in this diversity matter. Under Pennsylvania law, an
insurance contract is governed by the law of the state in
which the contract was made. Crawford v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co. of New York, 221 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).
“The interpretation of the scope of coverage of an insurance
contract is a question of law properly decided by the court.”
Regents of Mercersburg College v. Republic Franklin Ins.
Co., 458 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Med. Protective
Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal
11

quotation marks omitted)). The goal of that task is “to
ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the
language of the written instrument.” J.C. Penney Life Ins.
Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469
A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The policy definition of “Total Disability” provides:
during the first 12 consecutive months of
disability means that a member is not able to
perform substantially all of the duties of his
occupation on the date his disability
commenced because of a medically determined
sickness or accidental bodily injury. After the
first 12 consecutive months of disability, the
definition changes and requires the member to
be unable to perform any of the duties of his
occupation or any occupation for which he is
reasonably qualified by education, training or
experience.
(App. at 39.) Meyer contends, as he did before the District
Court, that this language is unambiguous and means that after
the first 12 consecutive months, the insured qualifies as
totally disabled if he can show either (1) that he is unable to
perform the duties of his occupation; or (2) that he is unable
to perform the duties of any occupation for which he is
reasonably qualified by education, training, or experience.
CUNA argues that the clause should not be interpreted
that way because the policy creates a shift from an “own
occupation” definition of disability to an “any occupation”
definition after 12 months. In effect, in the phrase, “or any
occupation for which he is reasonably qualified by education,
training or experience,” the “or” should be read conjunctively
as, “and.”
Applying Pennsylvania law, the District Court found
that the definition of “Total Disability” was ambiguous.
Although the Court found CUNA‟s interpretation of “Total
Disability” more reasonable than Meyer‟s, it noted that its
role was not to pick the most reasonable interpretation, but,
12

where two reasonable interpretations creating an ambiguity
exist, to choose the interpretation favoring the insured. Taken
in the context of the overall policy and applying the plain
meaning of “words and phrases,” it found Meyer‟s
interpretation reasonable, since the ordinary meaning of “or”
suggested a choice between two alternatives. (Id. at 54.)
CUNA claims that the District Court erred in
concluding that Meyer‟s interpretation was reasonable and
further argues that there was no evidence in the record of
Meyer‟s intent to enter the insurance contract under that
definition. CUNA also argues that adoption of Meyer‟s
interpretation is unreasonable because it allegedly violates
Pennsylvania law, including its rules of insurance policy
construction and applicable regulations governing credit
disability insurance coverage.
After
examining
the
parties‟
conflicting
interpretations, relevant case law, the policy‟s language and
purpose as a whole, and Pennsylvania principles of contract
construction, we conclude, as did the District Court, that the
definition of Total Disability is ambiguous and must be
construed in favor of Meyer, the insured.
The rules of analysis of insurance policies in
Pennsylvania are well established. Regents, 458 F.3d at 171
(citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980)). The goal of interpreting
an insurance policy, like that of interpreting any other
contract, is to determine the intent of the parties. It begins
with the language of the policy. See Madison Constr. Co. v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999). A
policy must be read as a whole and its meaning construed
according to its plain language. Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1999);
Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 488, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
The burden of drafting with precision rests with the
insurance company, the author of the policy. Pilosi, 393 F.3d
at 365. An ambiguity in contract language exists “when the
questionable term or language, viewed in the context of the
entire policy, is „reasonably susceptible of different
13

constructions and capable of being understood in more than
one sense.‟” Id. at 363 (quoting Med. Protective, 198 F.3d at
103); see also Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 100. Where a
term is ambiguous, it is to be construed against the insurer, in
favor of the insured. McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co.
of Am., 922 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Standard
Venetian Blind, 469 A.2d at 566). “The policy rationale
underlying strict application of the doctrine is that because
most insurance agreements are drafted by the insurance
industry, they are essentially contracts of adhesion.” Pittson
Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 520
(3d Cir. 1997) (applying New Jersey law).
“Where, however, the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that
language.” Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 106. Courts should
not distort the meaning of the language or strain to find an
ambiguity. Id.; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 761
(3d Cir. 1985). A contract is not rendered ambiguous merely
because the parties disagree about its construction. Williams
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 750 A.2d 881, 885 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000).
The instant case is not the typical one where a
technical term appearing in a policy is undefined within the
policy. In this case, the actual policy term in dispute, “Total
Disability,” is defined in the policy; however, the language in
that definition itself is at issue. Specifically, CUNA‟s use of
the word “or” in the second clause of the post-12 month
definition must be subject to scrutiny to edify the definition of
“Total Disability.”
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not
interpreted “or” in this particular context. “In the absence of
a definitive ruling by a state‟s highest court, we must predict
how that court would rule if faced with the issue.” Covington
v. Cont‟l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004).
In so doing, “„we must look to decisions of state intermediate
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting that state‟s law,
and of other state supreme courts that have addressed the
issue,‟ as well as to „analogous decisions, considered dicta,
scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending
14

convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would
decide the issue at hand.‟” Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623
F.3d 212, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co.
v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Looking first to the plain language of the definition,
we note that in Pennsylvania, when words of common usage
are used in an insurance policy, they should be construed in
their natural, plain and ordinary sense. Madison Constr., 735
A.2d at 108 (citing Easton v. Washington Cnty. Ins. Co., 137
A.2d 332, 335 (Pa. 1957)).
The court may also look to the dictionary definition.
Genaeya Corp v. Harco Nat‟l Ins. Co., 991 A.2d 342, 347
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citing Wall Rose Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)). Merriam
Webster‟s Eleventh Collegiate Dictionary (2005) defines “or”
as “—used as a function word to indicate an alternative.”
Pennsylvania‟s intermediate appellate court has made a
similar finding. See Frenchak v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 495
A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (interpreting a lease
and noting that “[t]he pertinent dictionary definition of „or‟ is
„choice between alternative things, states, or courses.‟”)
(citations omitted).
In the statutory interpretation context, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also held that “[t]he word
„or‟ is defined as a conjunction used to connect words,
phrases, or clauses representing alternatives.” In re Paulmier,
937 A.2d 364, 373 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).6 Though this definition appears in the context of

6

In a New Jersey class action insurance contract dispute, we
found that in the provision of a local controversy requirement,
which required that “principal injuries resulting from the
alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant
were incurred in the State in which the action was originally
filed,” the plaintiff‟s argument that “the disjunctive” or
should be interpreted as a “conjunctive” “and” was
unavailing. We affirmed the District Court‟s finding that the
plaintiff‟s interpretation was “at odds with the plain language
15

the court‟s statutory interpretation, we find it instructive. The
commonly used and understood definition of “or” suggests an
alternative between two or more choices.
CUNA points to a 1942 Pennsylvania Superior Court
case, Kensington Nat‟l Bank of Philadelphia v. Sampson, 26
A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942), to support its proposition that
“and” can be substituted for “or” depending on the context of
the language involved. We find Kensington distinguishable
and unpersuasive. It involved a life insurance policy which
insured the lives of a husband and wife and provided for
payment to the survivor upon either spouse‟s death. The
superior court affirmed the trial court‟s finding that “the
whole essence of the contract,” called a “joint policy,” and
whose premium was payable during the “joint lifetime” of the
insured, “was to give to one benefits upon the death of the
other. To allow one person to change it destroys the whole
plan of insurance and clearly the intention of the parties.”7 Id.
at 117-18. Although the context of that policy required a
conjunctive reading, we do not find such obvious intent in the
context of this case; one is certainly not required to read the
clause conjunctively, and in that sense, do not find that
Meyer‟s disjunctive reading is unreasonable.
Our conclusion that Meyer‟s disjunctive interpretation
of “or” is reasonable is further supported by the fact that we
may consider “whether alternative or more precise language,
if used, would have put the matter beyond reasonable
question” in resolving ambiguity. 8 Vlastos v. Sumitomo
of the provision.” Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co.,
561 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2009).
7

Alternatively, CUNA cites to cases from other circuits
interpreting federal or state law outside of Pennsylvania,
which are not controlling, that interpret the definition of “or”
in a dissimilar context. These references are likewise
unpersuasive in showing that Meyer‟s interpretation is
unreasonable.
8

Curiously, CUNA refers to its “intended use of the word
„or‟ in the „total disability‟ definition.” (Appellant‟s Reply
Br. at 21) (emphasis added). We frankly cannot reconcile this
16

Marine & Fire Ins. Co. (Europe) Ltd., 707 F.2d 775, 778 (3d
Cir. 1983) (citing Celley v. Mut. Benefit Health and Accident
Ass‟n, 324 A.2d 430, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Here, if CUNA had used the word
“and” instead of “or” to convey that it indeed intended a
conjunctive meaning in the second clause of the definition, it
would have put the matter “beyond reasonable question” in
resolving ambiguity.9
CUNA advances numerous arguments about why
Meyer‟s interpretation, the interpretation ultimately adopted
by the District Court, is unreasonable. Based on our analysis
of a plain reading of the language and common, disjunctive
meaning of the word “or,” we find that Meyer‟s interpretation
is not unreasonable.
Regarding CUNA‟s next argument that Meyer‟s
interpretation is unreasonable as repugnant to Pennsylvania
law, we recognize that in Pennsylvania, “stipulations in a
contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to,
statutory provisions which are applicable to, and
consequently form a part of, the contract, must yield to the
statute, and are invalid, since contracts cannot change existing
statutory laws.” Pennsylvania Nat‟l Mut. Cas. Co. v. Black,
916 A.2d 569, 579 (Pa. 2007) (citing Prudential Prop. and
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 813 A.2d 747, 751 (Pa. 2002)
(internal citations omitted)).

position, given the common disjunctive meaning of “or,” with
CUNA‟s proffered interpretation—a conjunctive meaning.
9

We also note that CUNA, in its form letter to Meyer
informing him that it would no longer pay his benefits, stated
that according to his credit disability insurance contract
definition of Total Disability, “[a]fter the initial 12
consecutive months of disability, the definition changes and
states that you must be disabled from performing any
occupation for which you are reasonably qualified by
education, training, or experience,” which does not include
the “any duties of his occupation or” part of the clause listed
in Meyer‟s policy definition. (App. at 41.)
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CUNA argues that 31 Pa. Code § 73.11(4) (1971), a
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance regulation in place at
the time the policy was drafted, mandates a shift for coverage
after 12 months from an own occupation standard to an any
occupation standard for disability insurers who charge prima
facie rates.10
The regulation provided, in relevant part:
The following premium rate standards are
applicable to policies providing credit accident
and health coverage which are issued with or
without evidence of insurability offered to all
debtors and containing:
***
(4) No definition of disability which
defines disability during the first 12 months of
disability as inability to perform any
occupation. The definition of disability during
such time period must be related to the
occupation of the borrower at the time such
disability occurs. Thereafter, disability will be
defined as the inability to perform any gainful
occupation for which the borrower is reasonably
fitted by education, training and experience.
31 PA. CODE § 73.11(4) (1971). The District Court found that
the regulation was a list of attributes in a credit insurance
contract for the policy to qualify for “premium rate
standards.”11 We agree with the District Court‟s assessment.
10

The District Court acknowledged that what was referred to
as “premium rate standards” in 1971 are now referred to as
“prima facie rates” under 31 PA. CODE § 73.107(b). CUNA
does not dispute this finding on appeal, and we use the terms
here interchangeably, presuming in CUNA‟s favor that it was
charging these rates at the time of Meyer‟s purchase.
11

The District Court noted that 31 PA. CODE § 73.11(4)
(1971) was amended in 1998 as 31 PA. CODE § 73.107(a)(5)
(1998). It concluded that the latter regulation, in place at the
18

The statute lists the requirements for an insurer that wishes to
charge prima facie rates; however, the statute does not
indicate that the insurer is required to charge prima facie
rates.
CUNA argues that record evidence supports charging
prima facie rates for its group credit disability insurance
coverage. Assuming this is the custom and practice in the
industry, CUNA has not presented evidence that under
Pennsylvania law, it is required to charge prima facie rates
and therefore required to utilize an “own” to “any”
occupation shift in its definition of Total Disability.
Notwithstanding that this evidence may otherwise support
CUNA‟s proffered intent and its reasonableness, it is not
evidence of Meyer‟s intent.
Furthermore, under Pennsylvania law, in close cases, a
court should resolve the meaning of insurance policy
provisions in favor of coverage for the insured. Motley v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. 1983)
(“[I]f [a court] should err in determining the meaning of an
insurance policy provision . . . , [its] error should be in favor
of coverage for the insured.”).
Additionally, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “[i]n the insurance
setting, a policy of insurance may expand, but cannot reduce,
time of Meyer‟s purchase of insurance in 1999, is concerned
with the proof required for disability, and not the definition of
Total Disability.
Additionally, it noted that the new
regulation clearly allows for alternate benefit plans that differ
from the features enumerated in section 73.107(a)(1-7).
Thus, the District Court found that the 1998 regulation
would apply to Meyer‟s policy and CUNA‟s argument that
the parties were bound by the terms of the 1971 regulation
would be incorrect. Nevertheless, since the 1971 regulation
was in effect when some of the class members bought their
insurance policies, the District Court analyzed the 1971
regulation to determine if Meyer‟s interpretation of “Total
Disability” was prohibited by law. CUNA does not address
this issue in its brief on appeal.
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coverage that is mandated by statute.” Burstein v. Prudential
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 220 (Pa. 2002).
We also find unpersuasive CUNA‟s last argument that
Meyer‟s interpretation is unreasonable because it allegedly
conflicts with industry custom and practice. CUNA cites to
Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
Co., 579 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2009), where we stated that,
among other factors in determining ambiguity in an insurance
contract, a court may look to industry custom and practice. In
that case, a title insurance policy dispute arose between two
insurance companies over whether rights of first refusal not
explicitly listed were covered by the policy, and we looked to
the title insurance industry‟s treatment of American Land
Title Association Endorsements. We found against defendant
drafter of the policy, and concluded that along with the text
and purpose of the policy, the custom and practice of the title
insurance industry also led to the same result. Id. at 311
(finding that the alternate result “r[an] roughshod over the
policy‟s language, purpose, and usage.”).
Here, the text of the policy definition does not align
with drafter CUNA‟s evidence of custom and industry
practice. The plain language of the provision is not consistent
with CUNA‟s evidence of custom and industry practice.
CUNA makes no allegation and presents no evidence of
Meyer‟s awareness of this industry practice or custom. Thus,
CUNA‟s additional evidence, though arguably enlightening
regarding its own intent, does not change our belief that
Meyer‟s interpretation, based on the plain language of the
provision, is reasonable.
Along this vein, CUNA claims that its interpretation is
the only reasonable one because Meyer‟s proposed
interpretation renders half of the definition‟s terms
meaningless by reading out the shift in the policy—that after
12 months, “it changes.” “[T]his Court takes care not to
render other portions of a provision or contract superfluous
when construing contract language.” New Castle Cnty.,
Delaware v. Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 174
F.3d 338, 349 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Delaware law) (citing
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Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 836 F.2d 163, 169
(3d Cir. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law)).
CUNA‟s argument, however, is unavailing, by looking
at the language of the definition in context. The plain
language in the first clause, modifying own occupation, could
certainly be read to shift from requiring a claimant to show
that he cannot perform “substantially all” of the duties—less
than all of those duties—to not being able to perform “any” of
the duties. This puts a greater onus on a claimant to meet the
threshold for coverage after the first 12 months of disability.
However, we recognize that reading the phrase
conjunctively creates an ambiguity if the duties of “any
occupation” for which a claimant is reasonably qualified is
read as being inclusive of his prior occupation. Looking at
the post-12 month clause in the order in which it is written—
first to one‟s abilities with respect to his own occupation—
would eliminate a need to continue reading the second part of
the clause to determine whether one can perform duties of
any occupation, if “any occupation” includes “the duties of
one‟s former occupation.”
Under that premise, after 12 months, an insured could
be in one of two situations with respect to his own
occupation. He could either (1) be able to perform none of
the duties of his former occupation; or (2) be able to perform
one or some of the duties of his former occupation. If he
cannot perform any of the duties of his occupation, construing
'or' disjunctively, he is qualified for coverage, and there is no
need to move to the second part of the clause—whether he
can perform the duties of any occupation for which he is
qualified—to determine coverage. If, on the other hand, an
insured can perform one or more tasks of his former
occupation, he is not qualified for coverage and there is no
need to look to the second part of the clause because he has
already failed to qualify for coverage—his own occupation is
a subset of any occupation for which he is qualified. Courts
should not distort the meaning of the language or strain to
find an ambiguity. Madison, 735 A.2d at 106. However,
such a reading is not a distortion; it does create some degree
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of ambiguity, making the phrase “capable of being
understood in more than one sense.”
Notwithstanding this potential contextual defect, we
will not override our conclusion that Meyer‟s interpretation of
Total Disability is reasonable when the plain language,
written by CUNA, offers an otherwise reasonable reading.
Cf. New Castle Cnty, 174 F.3d at 350 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying Delaware law) (finding that the potential defect of
rendering the word “wrongful” surplusage in an insurance
contract in certain contexts would not override the conclusion
that the plaintiff‟s interpretation was reasonable when that
defect itself was subject to competing interpretations and only
a potential infirmity). However, this reading does lead us to
find that the phrase is capable of being understood in more
than one sense and that a conjunctive interpretation is also
reasonable.12
We thus find that the definition of Total Disability is
ambiguous as it is capable of being understood in more than
one sense. However, as noted earlier, in Pennsylvania, “a
court construes ambiguities in an insurance policy strictly
against the insurer.” USX Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444
F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Standard Venetian Blind,
469 A.2d at 566).
Construing the ambiguity against CUNA, we find that
Meyer should have been covered after the first twelve months
while he could not perform any of the duties of his former
occupation.
We will affirm the District Court‟s
interpretation.

12

Still, reading the phrase conjunctively leads to other
problems in addition to the commonly understood meaning of
“or.” Reading the phrase conjunctively, one could argue that
inclusion of continued coverage if one cannot perform “any
of the duties of one‟s former occupation” is redundant or
unnecessary if “duties of any occupation for which one is
reasonably qualified” includes one‟s own occupation.
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B.

District Court’s Award of Relief in
Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment

CUNA next appeals the District Court‟s September 21,
2009 Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment.13 We review
a District Court‟s decision to grant a permanent injunction
under an abuse of discretion standard. Citizens Fin. Group,
Inc. v. Citizens Nat‟l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 126
(3d Cir. 2004). “An abuse of discretion exists where the
District Court‟s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, and errant conclusion of law, or an improper
application of law to fact.” A.C.L.U. of New Jersey v. Black
Horse Pike Reg‟l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir.
1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e
will not interfere with the district court‟s exercise of
discretion unless there is a definite and firm conviction that
the court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant
factors.” Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 683 (3d Cir. 1998)
(citing Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CUNA claims that the District Court abused its
discretion because the Permanent Injunction awarded
impermissibly broad relief on behalf of the former class
members. Specifically, CUNA asserts that the District
Court‟s injunction improperly imposed restrictions on CUNA
13

In deciding summary judgment, after finding that any
claimant who met the “own occupation” standard or the “any
occupation” standard would be totally disabled within the
meaning of the policy, the District Court did not address
damages or CUNA‟s liability with respect to each class
member because these individualized issues had not yet been
litigated. In its Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment,
prior to decertifying the class, the District Court noted that
subsequent to its summary judgment ruling on the
interpretation of the policy provision, “there remain triable
issues of fact regarding only Defendant‟s potential liability
for breach of contract.” (App. at 3-4.)
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in its claims process for policyholders and improperly
retained jurisdiction over claims process issues even after the
District Court had decertified the class. CUNA further argues
that the District Court, after decertifying the class, should
have let the former class members pursue individual breach of
contract claims, rather than enjoining CUNA from construing
the policy definition differently and allowing former class
members to pursue their disability benefits through the claims
process.14
Meyer responds that the District Court still had
jurisdiction over the claims of the entire class at the time that
it ordered injunctive relief for the class because it decertified
the class immediately after. Additionally, Meyer asserts that
following the District Court‟s Final Judgment, no individual
issues remained to be resolved because in Meyer‟s view, the
District Court essentially ordered specific performance of the
CUNA contract regarding each of the class members.
District courts are afforded considerable discretion in
framing injunctions. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 887-90, adopted in part on reh’g by,
809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 958
(1988), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973)). “Nevertheless,
injunctive relief should be no broader than necessary to
provide full relief to the aggrieved party.” Ameron, 787 F.2d
at 888 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702
(1979)); see Madsen v. Women‟s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 765 (1994) (noting that an injunction should be no
broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals).
In its Permanent Injunction, the District Court ordered
CUNA to follow certain procedures to process the claims
forms, including processing the forms in accordance with the
14

CUNA also asserts that the claims adjudication process
created by the District Court‟s Permanent Injunction and
Final Judgment adopts proof presumptions that vary from
those contained in the forms approved by the Pennsylvania
Department of Insurance. Because we find the injunction
overbroad for other reasons, we do not reach this argument.
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District Court‟s guidelines and using only the Court‟s
interpretation of “Total Disability.” Additionally, the District
Court‟s Permanent Injunction provided that if a claimant
opposed the outcome of CUNA‟s determination, he could file
a motion for contempt with the District Court, which, after
giving CUNA the opportunity to respond, would then review
CUNA‟s denial of the claim for benefits. If the District Court
determined that CUNA improperly denied benefits, it would
award prejudgment interest to the claimant from the date of
denial.
The District Court reserved for itself jurisdiction over
the entire claims process, noting that it “retain[ed] jurisdiction
of all matters relating to the interpretation, administration,
implementation, effectuation and enforcement of this
Injunction and this Final Judgment.” (App. at 6.)
The procedural posture here is seemingly unique and is
the source of our concern.15 We believe the District Court
abused its discretion in issuing an injunction in which it
retained jurisdiction over the class members‟ claims
throughout the claims procedure process after the class was
decertified. We are guided by the principle that “[i]n the
absence of a certified class action, [a plaintiff] [i]s only
entitled to relief for itself.”16 Ameron, 787 F.2d at 888 (citing
Nat‟l Ctr. for Immigrant Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 137172 (9th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1366
(3d Cir. 1974)).
15

At oral argument, counsel for Meyer acknowledged that he
was not aware of any decision where a court retained
jurisdiction over class members‟ claims where it subsequently
decertified that class.
16

It is a regular practice for a trial court to retain jurisdiction
over the enforcement of a settlement agreement. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1997)
(“federal district courts have no inherent authority to enforce
a settlement once a final judgment has been entered, but may
do so if the agreement expressly retains jurisdiction in the
court for enforcement purposes.”) (citing Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)).
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Additionally, in the context of an opt-in class, where
the district court denied class certification for an action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, we have held that “[a] court
which rejects a class as improper has no power to bind class
members not properly before it.” Lusardi v. Lechner, 855
F.2d 1062, 1079 (3d Cir. 1988). In Lusardi, the district court
held that the timely filing of individual charges in an age
discrimination lawsuit was necessary to the maintenance of
individual actions by opt-in class members at a point in time
when the class was not certified. We found that “[t]he power
to judge the merits of their individual claims lies with the
forum in which those claims are presented. . . [a] district court
has no power or jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the
claims of individual members of a putative opt-in class when
it denies class certification. This is clear legal error.” Id.
Others circuits have also found injunctions to be
overbroad where their relief amounted to class-wide relief
and no class was certified. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Cureton, 319
F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2003) (“While district courts are not
categorically prohibited from granting injunctive relief
benefitting an entire class in an individual suit, such broad
relief is rarely justified because injunctive relief should be no
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs.”) (alteration in original)
(citing Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702); see also Culver v. City of
Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2002) (suit became an
individual action when the class was decertified); Cf. Brown
v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989)
(“An injunction should be narrowly tailored to give only the
relief to which plaintiffs are entitled. Ordinarily, classwide
relief, such as the injunction here which prohibits sex
discrimination against the class of Boston University faculty,
is appropriate only where there is a properly certified class. . .
. But there is no such reason here for an injunction running to
the benefit of nonparties.”) (citations omitted).
Through its Permanent Injunction, the District Court
put in place a process by which class members would be
required to present their claims to CUNA, and CUNA would
be required to process those claims applying the Court‟s
interpretation of “Total Disability.” The injunction also
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required implementing particular burdens of proof on the
claimants, and providing claimants recourse to the same
District Court judge in the event that they were not satisfied
with the outcome of the claims process, which may result in
an award of prejudgment interest. This relief was obviously
not limited to Meyer, the only party plaintiff to the suit once
the class was decertified. Although the District Court entered
the Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment before
decertifying the class on the docket,17 at the point that the
class was decertified,18 the relief was overly broad. Once
decertification became effective, the District Court had no
jurisdiction over any of the claims of the putative class
members and therefore no ability to order that any relief be
granted to any claimant other than Meyer.
Here, the claims process set forth and the District
Court‟s assertion of jurisdiction effectively allowed the Court
to retain jurisdiction over the claims of former class members
despite decertification. In other words, the relief granted in
the Permanent Injunction was no longer narrowly tailored.
We find that the District Court abused its discretion in
awarding overly broad injunctive relief. Even if the District
Court had ruled on Meyer‟s claim, the relief in the form of the
injunction would have been overly broad. We will vacate the
Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment and remand to the
District Court for further action consistent with this opinion.

17

At the September 14, 2009 hearing, the District Court noted
that it “ha[d] to do the injunction first and then . . . decertify
the class.” (App. at 781.)
18

When it decertified the class, the District Court noted that it
did so “because the remaining issues to be adjudicated do not
satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a) and 23(b)(3) for class certification.” (App. at 4.)
Meyer, the class representative, does not appeal the
decertification.
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C.

Meyer’s Claims on Cross-Appeal

i. Estoppel, Waiver and Prejudgment Interests
On cross-appeal, Meyer asserts that the District Court
erred in failing to apply the theory of estoppel or waiver to
the class members‟ claims for damages in its final judgment.
Meyer also claims that the District Court failed to award
prejudgment interest to the class members‟ claims. We need
not reach these issues. They are moot given the District
Court‟s decertification of the class because any determination
by any court on the class members‟ behalf would fly in the
face of decertification. Additionally, there are no damages to
award.
As noted, we will vacate the District Court‟s
Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment requiring CUNA to
apply the District Court‟s interpretation of Total Disability
and engage in the District Court-ordered claims process
because we find that the Court‟s retention of jurisdiction
taken together with the scope of the injunction awarded
overly broad relief to the former class members. Because of
our disposition of that issue, we believe it would be premature
to decide the issue of prejudgment interest at this time. See,
e.g., Fernandez v. Levin, 548 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 1988) (a
plaintiff who succeeds on a contract claim is entitled to
prejudgment interest). Accordingly, we will vacate the
District Court‟s denial of prejudgment interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court‟s ruling on summary judgment interpreting the policy
definition in Meyer‟s favor that a subscriber is entitled to
coverage under the benefit policy after 12 months if he can
show that he is (1) unable to perform any of the duties of his
occupation, or alternatively is able to show that he is (2)
unable to perform any of the duties of any occupation for
which he is reasonably qualified by education, training or
experience. We will also vacate and remand the District
Court‟s order of Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment.
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